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This  paper  examines  the  role  of  institutional  environments  on  cotton  farmer  technical 
efficiency  scores  in  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  and  Mali  using  a  stochastic  frontier  production 
approach.  First,  the  key  institutional  changes  that  have  occurred  with  the  recent  market-
oriented reforms are discussed. Then, farm efficiency per country is measured using cross-
sectional data collected by the Cotton Sector Reform Project of the Africa, Power, and Politics 
Programme in 2009. Results from a one-stage estimation procedure suggest that while no 
technical inefficiency exists in Benin, an average technical efficiency of 69% and 46% is found 
in Burkina Faso and Mali, respectively. Agricultural development policies focusing on reducing 
the inefficiency at the farm level in Mali and Burkina Faso should be adopted; whereas policies 
designed  to  shift  outward  the  production  frontier  seem  more  appropriate  in  Benin. 
Interestingly, institutional environment factors explaining variations in efficiency scores differ 
across  countries.  In  Mali,  farms  that  are  food  secure  and  that  cultivate  more  hectares  of 
cereals are more technically efficient in producing cotton. In contrast, Burkinabe farmers who 
are  dissatisfied  with  the  management  of  their  producer  organizations  are  more  technically 
efficient. To be successful, efforts to promote efficiency would have to work in concert with the 
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Cotton is a key cash crop commodity with important implications for agricultural development and 
poverty  alleviation  in  West  Africa
1.  The  importance  of  the  cotton  sectors  can  be  gauged  by 
considering that they provide employment and income to millions of smallholder farmers and cotton 
exports represent about 20%, 60%, and 80% of total agricultural export values in Benin, Mali, and 
Burkina Faso, respectively (FAO, 2011) In addition to being a major source of foreign exchange for 
the government and a main source of revenues for poor rural households, West African cotton 
sectors have multiplier effects on the rural economy and even on the economy as a whole (See 
Baden  and  Alpert,  2007;  Nubukpo  and  Keita,  2005).  Therefore,  improving  efficiency  in  cotton 
sectors has the potential to induce economic growth and poverty reduction.   
 
Traditionally,  West  African  cotton  sectors  have  been  vertically  integrated,  with  state-owned 
enterprises acting with near monopsony power in seed cotton markets and near monopoly power in 
credit market for the distribution of agricultural inputs necessary for cotton  production, such as 
seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. In addition to purchasing all seed cotton at fixed and guaranteed 
pan-territorial  prices,  state-run  companies  oversaw  agricultural  advice,  input  supply,  transport, 
ginning, and marketing services. Under this system, the viability of West African cotton sectors 
depended on the ability of the state-owned enterprises to produce surplus in times of high world 
prices  and  to  rely  on  financial  support  from  national  governments  in  times  of  low  international 
prices (Badiane et al., 2002). A combination of low world prices, lack of transparency, and general 
mismanagement in ginning operations led to significant deficits in West African cotton sectors in 
the  1990s.  Given  the  importance  of  cotton  in  West  Africa  economies,  governments  and 
international institutions stepped in to cover their financial losses during this time period. 
 
In response to the financial problems posed by poor performance of West African cotton sectors, 
reforms  within  the  framework  of  the  structural  adjustment  programs  (SAPs)  have  been 
recommended.  Major  intents  of  the  SAPs  have  been  to  resolve  the  financial  crisis  faced  by 
governments  and  to  revitalize  the  production  structures  by  removing  structural  rigidities  and 
inefficiencies in the economy (Baffes and Gautam, 1996; p.765). For instance these policies have 
encouraged  the  progressive  withdrawal  of  state-run  enterprises  in  the  agricultural  sector.  It  is 
assumed that successful reforms would stimulate cotton production by allowing farmers to allocate 
more efficiently their resources.  
 
Concretely, West African countries started to reorganize their cotton sector by privatizing certain 
market  operations  (e.g.,  transport,  ginning,  and  marketing),  liberalizing  other  segments  of  the 
market (e.g., input procurement), and by strengthening their farmer organizations to involve them 
more actively in critical decisions. The dismantlement of state-owned enterprises also led to the 
curtailment  of  technical  assistance  and  extension  services.  However,  the  withdrawal  of  the 
government in the provision of these services has not been accompanied by the entrance of new 
actors. There have been discussions on “getting the prices right” by aligning seed cotton prices 
(a.k.a., farm-gate prices) with world prices, but this liberalization policy has not been implemented
2. 
To enhance West African cotton sector competitiveness and ensure its long-run viability, efforts to 
promote efficiency are crucial, especially at the gin and farm levels. 
                                                           
1 In this present work, West Africa refers to Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali cotton sectors. 
2 The Malian cotton sector has experienced with price liberalization policy during 2005-08 but has since reverted 
(See Nubukpo and Keita, 2005) 4 
 
With millions of smallholder farmers depending partially or totally on cotton for their livelihood, it is 
important  to  better  understand  which  factors  influence  farm  efficiency  to  ensure  that  the 
implemented  reforms  would  lead  to  the  desired  outcomes.  The  objective  of  this  research  is, 
therefore, to expand the existing literatures on cotton reforms and efficiency by briefly discussing 
the  institutional  environments  in  which  farmers  have  been  producing  cotton  first,  and,  then, 
quantitatively estimate the technical efficiency scores of producers in Benin, Burkina Faso, and 
Mali using a stochastic frontier production model. Specifically, a one-stage estimation procedure is 
used to examine the effects of institutional environments on the technical efficiency scores at the 
farm-level in all three countries
3. Cotton producers’ technical efficiency is defined as their ability to 
produce maximum amount of output from a given set of inputs and technology. Using a unique 
dataset derived from surveys of cotton producers (conducted under the Cotton Reform Project 
teams of the Africa, Power and Politics Programme in summer 2009), this work show how farmers’ 
performance and their determinants vary from one country to another, and provides guidance on 
the fundamental environmental factors that should be taken into account for the cotton sector to be 
successful and sustainably revitalized in each country.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. The institutional environments, including market structures of 
the  cotton  sectors  in  Benin,  Burkina  Faso  and  Mali  are  briefly  described  in  section  2.  The 
measurement of technical efficiency is addressed in section 3. A description of the data, variables, 
and model used is provided in section 4.  Empirical results are presented and discussed in section 
5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Institutional Environments 
 
This  section  briefly  discusses  changes  that  have  occurred  in  the  market  structures,  ginning 
company ownership and activities, input procurement functions, and producer organizations since 
the implementation of cotton reforms in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali    (See Table 1).  
 
2.1 Pre-Reform Institutional Settings 
 
Historically,  West  African  cotton  sectors  shared  a  similar  institutional  setting  that  was  laid  out 
during the colonial period. In all three countries, the French company, CFDT
4, played an important 
role in the development of their cotton sectors by providing technical advice and inputs to farmers, 
and  by  transporting,  ginning,  and  marketing  cotton  (see  Baffes,  2001).  Following  the  country’s 
independence,  cotton  sectors  got  nationalized  and  state-owned  enterprises  were  created;  the 
CMDT in Mali, the SOFITEX in Burkina Faso, and the SONAPRA in Benin
5.  Unlike in Benin, where 
the SONAPRA was fully owned by the state, the CMDT and the SOFITEX were initially a joint 
venture between the CFDT
6 and the Malian and Burkinabe government, respectively. Following the 
vertical structure already established by the CFDT, these state-run companies were responsible for 
input procurement, technical assistance and extension, transport, ginning and marketing services.  
                                                           
3 Regressions are at the country level, since statistical evidences are found against pooling the datasets (See 
section 5.4 for a detailed description of the statistical test.  
4 CFDT is the acronyme for «Compagnie française pour le développement des fibres textiles» 
5 CMDT is the acronyme for “Compagnie Malienne de développement des textiles” 
SOFITEX is the acronyme for “Société Burkinabé des fibres et textiles ” 
SONAPRA is the acronyme for “Société Nationales de Promotion Agricole ” 
6 The CFDT became Dagris in 2001 and then Geocoton in 2008. 5 
 
The first producer organizations (POs) to be established were village-wide and they regrouped both 
cotton and non-cotton farmers. They were known as village associations (AVs)
7 in Mali and as 
village groups (GVs)
8 in Benin and Burkina Faso. Through their POs, farmers were able to get 
inputs on credit provided by the state-owned enterprises at the beginning of the season. After the 
harvest, state-owned enterprises recouped their costs by deducting what farmers owned them from 
their  cotton  payment.  Although  their  establishment  contributed  positively  to  empower  cotton 
farmers by transferring them responsibilities in the collection, grading and weighting of seedcotton, 
the  absence  of  exclusive  membership  in  the  AVs  and  GVs  made  input  distribution  and  credit 
management more difficult to manage. Indeed, non-cotton farmers were allowed to get inputs on 
credit, even though cotton remained the principal means of revenues to pay back loans and some 
farmers decided to free-ride by selling inputs obtained on credit on the black market, assuming that 
other farmers would cover their loans (Gray, 2008). As a result of input diversion, bad governance, 
and mismanagement, there was accrued indebtedness at both individual and PO levels.  
 
Although cotton producer organizations from the three West African cotton sectors under study 
have  suffered  from  indebtedness,  only  the  Burkina  Faso  government  made  the  decision  of 
canceling their debts accumulated over the past campaigns. On the other side of the border, the 
Malian government is examining whether solvable farmers should be rewarded for their good credit 
rather than eliminating insolvable farmer’s debts. The argument is that eliminating debts sends the 
wrong incentives to farmers and forgiveness of agricultural debt reduces the costs of credit default 
for farmers, making such outcomes more likely to  occur again (Govereh,  1999; Dorward et  al. 
1998).  
 
2.2 Post-Reform Institutional Settings 
 
Even  though  the  pre-reform  institutional  setting  was  similar,  the  pace  and  path  of  the  market-
oriented reforms have considerably differed across the three countries. Contrary to Mali, where 
cotton  reforms  have  been  mainly  undertaken  to  satisfy  international  institutions  and  donors, 
restructuration of the Benin cotton sector was from the beginning wanted by the State (Yerima and 
Affo, 2009; p.59). Therefore, Benin has been a first mover by privatizing the input procurement 
activities and by establishing privately owned ginning companies by the mid-1990. However, it is 
only  in  2008,  after  several  postponements,  that  the  partial  privatization  of  the  Beninese  state-
owned enterprise, SONAPRA became finalized through the creation of SODECO. A private partner 
holds  33.5%  of  SODECO`s  share  whereas  the  government  holds  66.5%,  from  which  33%  will 
eventually be transferred to producers, local authorities, citizens and gin workers (EU-ACP, 2009) 
Interestingly, the private shareholder in SODECO also owns other gins in Benin. In fact, with his 
involvement in SODECO, this private actor has secured its dominant position in the Benin cotton 
sector by owning 16 gins out of 18 nationwide (Saizonou, 2008). Given that almost all ginning and 
marketing activities within the Benin cotton sector are managed by the same private operator, the 
transit toward a more competitive structure seems compromise. Indeed, a monopolistic structure 
better characterizes the Beninese cotton market, but private rather than public this time.  
 
In 1999, the partial privatization of the Burkinabe state-owned enterprise, SOFITEX, followed an 
unconventional market reforms path by transferring 30% of the governmental shares to farmers 
rather than to private investors (Kaminski and Serra, 2011). This initiative aimed at empowering 
farmers  by  involving  them  more  actively  in  critical  decisions  such  as  input  and  producer  price 
                                                           
7 AVs is the acronyme for “Associations villageoises” 
8 GVs is the acronyme for “Groupement villageois” 6 
 
determination.  The  government  retained  35%  of  the  capital  in  SOFITEX  and  private  operators 
owned the remaining 35%. Particularly, the French company, Dagris, held a 34% ownership and 
the local banks the remaining 1% (Sofitex, 2005).  
 
The cotton reforms also led to the establishment of two new ginning companies, FASO COTON 
and SOCOMA, in 2004. A particularity of the Burkinabe cotton sector is the presence of zoning, 
which  consists  of  demarcating  the  cotton  producing  area  into  exclusive  zones  for  specific 
companies.  Farmers  producing  within  a  zone  have  to  deal  exclusively  with  the  gin  company 
assigned to operate there. The principle of zoning is to limit problems of malpractices in the cotton 
sector, such as poaching
9 and unsatisfactory technical and extension services (ICAC, 2010).  
 
Even though the reforms undertaken by the Burkina Faso to revitalize their cotton sector has been 
considered as a success story in the early 2000s (World Bank, 2004; Goreux and Macrae, 2003), 
they did not lead to better financial performances in the long-run. Indeed, in 2007 SOFITEX was 
first  recapitalized  entirely  by  the  government  after  the  major  private  investor  decided  to  not 
contribute, and, then, FASO COTON and SOCOMA had to be recapitalized the following years to 
avoid bankruptcy. It has been suggested that the inflexibility in the price mechanism to pass world 
price  fluctuations  to  farmers  contributed  to  the  financial  losses  incurred  by  the  gin  companies 
during 2004-06 (Yartey, 2008). With approximately 85% of the national cotton production managed 
by SOFITEX, which is now largely owned by the government, the Burkinabe cotton sector is again 
characterized  by  the  presence  of  a  large  public  monopoly.  Since  the  recapitalization,  the 
government has adopted a multifaceted strategy to reduce SOFITEX costs, which should ultimately 
lead to the sale of 30% shares to a private investor.  
 
In  comparison  with  Benin  and  Burkina  Faso,  Mali  has  been  a  latecomer  to  undertake  the 
privatization reform process recommended by the international institutions and donors. Indeed, the 
privatization of the state-owned enterprise, CMDT, has not been completed yet. Proposed dates of 
privatization have been several times postponed. At the latest, national and foreign investors made 
purchasing offers to the Malian government to acquire one or more of the four regional monopolies 
that will be created with the dismantlement of the CMDT and the establishment of cotton production 
zoning.  Once  the  privatization  is  completed,  the  four  regional  gin  monopolies-  Northeastern, 
Southern, Central, and Western- will be owned at 61% by private operators, 20% by producers, 
17% by the State, and 2% by the workers (ICAC, 2008a).  
 
Refocusing  the  ginning  company  activities  on  the  cotton  system  is  one  of  the  key  strategies 
proposed by the reforms to improve the efficiency and performance of the West African cotton 
sectors. As a result, gins have gradually withdrawn from rural development activities. For instance, 
the  CMDT  progressively  disengaged  from  the  provision  of  public  services  outside  the  cotton 
sectors (such as maintaining roads and ensuring access to drinkable water to rural population) and 
from the active promotion of integrated farming systems based on livestock production and cereals. 
Furthermore, there has been a decline in the technical and extension services offered to producers, 
since  neither  the  government  nor  private  investors  stepped  in  to  offer  services  no  longer 
considered to be the gin responsibilities. To deal with the lack of technical support, the Beninese 
                                                           
9 Poaching occurs when farmers receive input on credit by one ginning company at the beginning of the cotton 
season on promise of selling them their production but at the moment of the harvest, they sell it to a competitor 
that offered them higher prices. As a result, the gin that initially offered inputs on credit cannot recoup totally its 
costs and, thus, will eventually limit its services of inputs on credit to farmers.  7 
 
“Interprofession
10”  decided  to  hire  more  technicians  to  ensure  a  better  service  to  its  producers 
(Yerima,  2010,  p:31  vol.I).  To  our  knowledge,  this  initiative  has  not  been  followed  in  Mali  and 
Burkina Faso yet.  
 
With the cotton reforms, the POs have been reorganized with the aims of becoming solvable and 
better  positioned  to  defend  their  member  interests  within  the  cotton  sector.  The  Malian  village 
associations  were  transformed  in  cotton  producer  cooperative  societies  (SCPCs
11),  the  village 
groups  in  Benin  and  Burkina  Faso  into  village  cotton  producer  groups  (GVPCs
12)  and  cotton 
producer groups (GPCs
13), respectively. Under these new structures, membership is restricted to 
cotton farmers only. Cotton producers can freely create their own organizations based on other 
member  affinities,  such  as  levels  of  indebtedness  or  field  proximity.  However,  the  presence  of 
strong kinship makes exclusion of members less likely. A joint liability program, known as “caution 
solidaire” prevails in the SCPCs, GPCs, and GVPCs. Therefore, members of a same PO are jointly 
liable for each other’s loans. Given that the most performing farmers have to use their own profits 
to cover the financial losses of the less performing ones, tensions among members exist. In some 
cases, the best performing farmers even stopped cultivating cotton (Gray, 2008). Indeed, the joint 
liability program has been the source of conflict among POs in each country, since indebtedness 
remains  highly  problematic  (See  Yerima  2010;  Kaminski,et  al.,  2009,  and  Fok  2007  for  a 
description of the problems faced in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali, respectively). 
 
With the reforms, Beninese cotton farmers became able to order inputs on credit for both their 
cereal and cotton production. Opening the input access to both types of crops was seen as a 
solution to reduce input diversion from cotton to cereal fields. Input diversion has always existed 
and has even been tolerated to some extent. However, difficulties emerge when input diversion 
becomes greater than a minimum acceptable and when monitoring of repayment is slack. With less 
inputs used on cotton fields, cotton production declines, and farmers are more likely to default on 
their credit repayment. Therefore, input diversion was and remains a potential cause of high level 
of indebtedness faced by the majority of POs. With the privatization process, import and distribution 
of inputs became two separate activities in Benin and led to the introduction of a new intermediary, 
the  Cotton  Inputs  Commission  (CIC),  formerly  the  Provisioning  and  Management  Agricultural 
Inputs cooperative (CAGIA) (Saizonou, 2008). Political interests highly interfered in the selection 
process of private firms to provide essential inputs to farmers. As a result, firms were more likely to 
be selected based on their social networks rather than on the quality of their services and their 
expertise (Yerima, 2009; p.55). Therefore, farmers have often complained about the poor quality of 
inputs purchased.  
 
Interestingly,  by  refocusing  the  ginning  activities  toward  cotton  only,  the  CMDT  progressively 
disengaged from rural developmental services, such as access to inputs and advice for cereals 
crops in cotton areas. Indeed, all activities related to inputs meant for CMDT cereal crops were 
transferred to the cotton and cereal producer union group, GSCVM
14. However, due to the lack of 
experience in handling logistical operations and lacks of collateral to ensure loan repayment to 
input suppliers, GSCVM has had important difficulties in providing cereal inputs on credit to farmers 
                                                           
10 An “interprofession” is a formally organized association that groups key stakeholders involved in the cotton 
sector. Their objectives are to enhance market performance, through more efficient coordination and to defend 
the sector interests.  
11 SCPCs is the acronyme for “Societes cooperatives des producteurs de coton” 
12 GVPCs is the acronyme for “Groupements villageois des producteurs de cotton” 
13 GPCs is the acronyme for “Groupement des producteurs de coton” 
14 GSCVM is the acronyme for “Goupement des syndicats cotonniers et vivriers du Mali” 8 
 
(IFDC,  2004).  Being  used  to  cultivate  in  integrated  systems,  it  is  not  uncommon  for  Malian 
producers to divert some of their cotton inputs toward their cereal fields. On one hand, diversion 
may be a mean to cope with the lack of access to cereal inputs on credit. On the other hand, 
diversion may be more a sign that cotton prospects are bleak rather than due to lack of access to 
inputs. With the privatization of the CMDT, activities related to cotton input procurement has been 
progressively transferred to the national union of the cotton producer cooperatives, UN-SCPC
15.  
 
In  Burkina  Faso,  input  supply  functions  have  also  been  transferred  to  the  national  union  of 
Burkinabe cotton producers, UNPCB, following the privatization of SOFITEX. However, unlike in 
Mali, inputs meant for both cereal and cotton crops are managed by the UNPCB. After the harvest, 
credit for both cotton and cereal inputs are directly deducted from farmer cotton payment. Linking 
cereal inputs on credit to cotton payment have contributed to increase their availability. 
 
For  the  reforms  to  be  successful  in  sustainably  revitalizing  West  African  cotton  sectors,  it  is 
essential to get a better understanding on how the institutional environments, in which farmers are 
growing  cotton,  influence  their  performance.  A  wide  array  of  applied  work  has  looked  at  the 
sources of inefficiency in agriculture of developing countries, including the cotton sector. However, 
previous studies on farm-level efficiency of cotton producers have focused on a single-country case 
and have not specifically  assessed the roles of institutional environments (e.g., Audibert et al., 
2003; Shafiq and Rehman, 2000; Bravo-Ureta and Evenson, 1993). At present, there is no known 
cross-country empirical analysis that explicitly examines the roles of institutional environments on 
African  cotton  sectors  efficiency  at  the  farm-level.  This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  by 
measuring and comparing the technical efficiency scores of cotton producers in three West African 
countries  and  by  analyzing  the  role  of  institutional  environments,  such  as  joint  liability  credit 
programs and extension services, on farmer performance. Results should provide useful insight to 
policy-makers regarding how cotton producer performances are influenced by local market and 
institutional realities. 
 
3 Measurement of Technical Efficiency 
 
Literature on efficiency of productive units, which has been shaped by the seminal work of Farrell 
(1957), can be classified according to whether the measurement technique used is non-parametric 
or parametric. The development envelopment analysis (DEA) and the stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA)  are  the  most  commonly  non-parametric  and  parametric  methods,  respectively,  used  to 
measure the relative efficiency on farm-level data at one point in time
16. Both the DEA and the SFA 
approaches  recognize  the  possibility  of  inefficiency  in  production.  They  do  not  assume  that  all 
farmers are technically efficient. Being both extensively used in measuring production efficiency in 
agricultural sector of developing countries, the advantages and limits associated with these two 
competing methods, DEA and SFA, are briefly discussed
17.  
 
Developed  in 1978 by Charnes et al., the DEA method consists of mathematical programming 
formulations, where inefficient producing units are compared with the most efficient (best) units 
within the sample. The initial assumption of constant returns to scale was relaxed by Banker et al. 
(1984) to allow for variable returns to scale. The advantage of non-parametric techniques, such as 
                                                           
15 UN-SCPC is the acronym for “Union nationale des sociétés coopératives des producteurs de coton 
16 In addition to cross-sectional data, both the DEA and SF methods can also be used to measure efficiency on 
panel data. 
17 See Coelli et al. (2005) for a more comprehensive discussion on both methods.  9 
 
the DEA, is that they do not rely on assumptions about the functional form or about the distribution 
of the error terms. The main limitation of the DEA method comes from its deterministic nature, 
which assumes that any deviation from the production frontier is due to inefficiency. Therefore, any 
measurement  error  and/or  random  stochastic  error  in  the  data  are  confounded  with  farmer 
inefficiency. As a result, the DEA estimates are very sensitive to the sample data, and especially to 
outliers (Greene, 1993).   
 
The SFA approach, which estimates the parametric form of a production function and recognizes 
the presence of random errors terms in the data, was first introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and by 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). This regression-based method incorporates a composed 
error term. One component of the error term reflects the inefficiency in production while the other 
component represents the random effects outside producer control, including luck, (un) favorable 
climate conditions, measurement error and other statistical noise from the data. The production 
frontier itself is stochastic since it varies randomly across farms due to the presence of the random 
error component (Coelli et al. 1999). Unlike the DEA method that estimates the best observed 
practice,  the  SFA  approach  econometrically  estimates  the  best  theoretical  practice.    The  main 
criticism of this econometric technique is that strong assumptions have to be made concerning the 
selection of a particular functional form and the distribution of the inefficiency component in the 
composed error term.  Nevertheless, the SFA model has the advantages of being able to measure 
the individual inefficiency in the presence of statistical noise in the dataset and to estimate standard 
errors.   
 
Given that both have virtues and shortcomings, the choice of an approach to measure efficiency 
becomes almost philosophical. Empirical studies on technical efficiency for cotton farmers have 
used either the DEA (e.g.,Gul et al., 2009; Helfand and Levine, 2004;  Audibert et al. 2003; Shafiq 
and Rehman, 2000) or the SFA (e.g., Thirtle et al., 2003; Bravo-Ureta and Evenson, 1994 ) or both 
(e.g.,  Chakraborty  et  al.,  2002).  In  the  context  of  agriculture  in  developing  countries,  where 
imperfections in credit and chemical input markets exist, the assumption that random shocks, such 
as weather and unpredictable variation in labor performance, do not influence productivity becomes 
questionable. In addition to being influenced by the main underlying assumptions, the decision to 
use one approach over the other depends upon the data available and the types of analysis. For 
instance,  the  DEA  technique  has  the  ability  to  easily  handle  multiples  outputs  and  inputs. 
Alternatively, the stochastic frontier is better suited to analyze the determinants of inefficiency since 
the inclusion of environmental variables can be done in one-stage rather than two-stages to avoid 
implicit bias. Given that the objective is to examine how different environmental contexts, market 
structures and institutional arrangements in the cotton sector influence efficiency at the farm-level, 
and given that random effects non controllable by farmers are considered to impact productivity, 
the SFA method is considered more appropriate. 
 
Comparing 32 frontier studies using farm-level data from developing countries, Thiam et al. (2001) 
did  not  find  TE  estimates  from  SFA  to  be  statistically  different  from  those  using  the  DEA 
deterministic approach. Obviously, the smallest the component of the error term due to random 
shocks and statistical noise, the closest the estimates from both methods are. The use of panel 
data rather than cross-sectional also improves the accuracy of the measured efficiency (Greene, 
1993). Using panel data, Ruggiero (2007) also concluded that DEA and SFA methods generated 
similar results. Therefore, the decision of measuring cotton farmer efficiency through econometric 
techniques rather than linear programming should not be seen as a limitation, since it has been 
shown to lead to similar results. 
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3.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 
Following the model proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), the general stochastic frontier production 
function can be expressed as, 
 
    =     ;   +      =   exp      +   ),                       = 1….                                                           (1) 
                                                                                             
where,       denotes the output of the i-th farmer,     represents a (Kx1) vector of input quantities of 
the i-th farmer, β is a (Kx1) vector of unknown production elasticity parameters to be estimated, 
and    is the double component error term. It is postulated that     =    −   , where      represents 
the classical symmetric disturbance term and      is the technical inefficiency component to be 
estimated. The symmetric error component,   , is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed  as   0,  
 ).  The  one-side  error  component,    ,  is  assumed  to  be  distributed 
independently of   , to satisfy     ≥ 0, and is derived from a   0,  
 ) half-normal distribution. A 
higher value of the one-side component,   , implies an increase in the farmer technical inefficiency. 
A  value  of      equals  to  zero  means  that  there  is  perfect  technical  efficiency.    Borrowing  from 
Battese and Coelli (1988), the technical efficient of the i-th farm can be represented as,  
 
    =
  
   
∗ =
  
      ′       =
     ′
         
      ′
         = exp  −                                                                             (2) 
                                                       
A basic stochastic production frontier is depicted in Figure 1. The vertical axis represents the level 
of cotton output whereas the horizontal axis represents the inputs used to produce cotton output. In 
absence of noise effects (  ), the production frontier is considered to be deterministic rather than 
stochastic. The deterministic production frontier is represented by the curve. The observed cotton 
production levels of two farmers, 1 and 2, are represented by squares. The first farmer uses inputs 
defined by X1 and obtains a level of cotton production equals to Y1. In the presence of favorable 
conditions, the noise effects are positive, and the frontier output (Y1*) is above the deterministic 
production frontier. The second farmer uses inputs defined by X2 and produces Y2. The frontier 
output  Y2*  is  below  the  deterministic  frontier  production  due  to  the  presence  of  unfavorable 
conditions  (negative  noise  effects).  Interestingly,  the  second  farmer  is  judged  technically  more 
efficient relative to the unfavorable conditions associated with the production cotton activities than if 
judged relative to the maximum output possible given the deterministic production frontier. The 
inefficiency  effect  (  )  can  be  seen  as  the  difference  between  what  farmers  are  producing 
(observed cotton output Y) and what they are capable of producing given the conditions (frontier 
output Y*).  
 
Note that the production frontier above does not take into account the possibility that cotton farmers 
may  be  facing  different  institutional  arrangements  that  may  influence  their  technical  efficiency. 
Later research has extended this basic model in order to take into account the environment in 
which farmers are producing. Two major alternative extensions have been developed (See Coelli et 
al., 1999). The first one assumes that the environment directly affects the production function and 
the shape of the technology available. Consequently, each farmer is assumed to face a different 
production  frontier.  The  environmental  condition  variables  are  added  to  the  original  model  as 
follows, 
 
     =     ,  ; ,   +      =   exp      +     +   ),                 = 1….                                              (3) 
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where,    represents a (Mx1) vector of environmental factors in which the i-th farmer produce and   
is a (Mx1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The technical efficiency becomes net of 
environmental influences.  
 
In the second approach, the environment directly affects the technical efficiency score rather than 
the  production  frontier  and  technology.  This  model  extension  relies  on  the  assumption  that  all 
farmers share the same technology and, therefore, face the same production frontier. The distance 
between  farmer’s  efficiency  score  and  the  best  practice  function  varies  with  the  environment 
conditions. The impact of environment on technical efficiency can be measured using either a two-
stage or a one-stage procedure. In the two-stage method, the stochastic production frontier and the 
technical efficiency (TE) scores, as stated by equations 1 and 2 respectively, are first estimated. 
Then, the TE scores are regressed upon a set of environmental explanatory variables, including 
farmer demographic characteristics and institutional arrangements.  
 
The  two-stage  estimation  in  the  second  approach  has  been  criticized  for  being  contradictory 
(Kumbhakar  and  Lovell,  2000,  p.262-264;  Coelli,  1998,  p.207-209).  In  the  first  stage,  both 
components of the error term are assumed to be identically and independent distributed, however, 
the regression of different factors on the inefficiency score in the second stage suggests that these 
latter  are  not  identically  distributed  (e.g.,  Coelli  et  al.,  1999;  Battese  and  Coelli,  1995).  The 
omission  of  environmental  variables  in  the  first-stage  is  also  criticized  for  leading  to  biased 
estimated coefficients in both the production frontier and technical efficiency scores (Coelli,  2005; 
Wang and Schmidt, 2002). 
 
The one-stage estimation of the second approach satisfies the assumptions while estimating the 
effect of environment directly through the technical efficient score. This approach, which allows the 
environmental  factors  to  directly  affect  the  stochastic  component  error  term  of  the  production 
frontier, has been developed for cross-sectional data by Kumbhakar et al. (1991), and extended to 
panel data by Battese and Coelli (1993). Under this approach, the inefficiency score of the i-th farm 
has a distribution that varies with the farm-specific characteristics,   , and, therefore, the one-sided 
error terms are no longer identically distributed. The new technical inefficiency term is described 
as; 
 
µi = δ’zi + wi                                                                                                                                                                                                 (4) 
 
where,    is a (Mx1) vector of environmental factors in which the i-th farmer produce and   is a 
(Mx1)  vector  of  unknown  parameters  to  be  estimated.  The  asymmetric  error  component,  ,  is 
assumed to be distributed independently and to follow a    ′  ,  
 ) distribution truncated at zero. 
Equation (4) is then added to equation (1) in order to estimate simultaneously all the unknown 
parameters  (βs,  δs,   
 ,  and    
   )  of  the  production  frontier  and  inefficiency  using  the  maximum 
likelihood method. Following Battese and Coelli (1992), the variances are parameterized as; 
 
   
  =   
  +   
   ;        =   
 /  
                                                                                                    (5) ;  (6) 
 
where,    must lie between 0 and  1 in  order to start the iterative maximization process. If   is 
statistically  different  from  zero  using  a  one-sided  likelihood  test,  then  there  is  presence  of 
inefficiency in the model. With inefficiency, the production frontier method is more appropriate than 
ordinary least squares.  
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Whether  to  choose  the  first  (environment  affects  directly  production  frontier)  or  the  second 
(environment  influences  directly  technical  efficiency)  approach  is  a  matter  of  philosophical 
perspective  as  mentioned  by  Coelli  et  al.  (1999,  p.252).  Although  both  approaches  have  been 
used, the one-step estimation in the second approach has received further attention in the recent 
literature  (e.g.,  Bhandari  and  Maiti,  2007)  and  seems  more  appropriate  for  the  analysis  of 
institutional arrangements in the context of West African cotton sector. It is assumed that each 
farmer  faces  a  similar  production  frontier,  but  the  environment  in  which  they  are  producing 
influences their efficiency.  
 
4 Data and Model 
4.1 Data 
 
The  data  used  for  this  analysis  comes  from  the  Africa,  Power,  and  Politics  (APP)  surveys 
conducted by the cotton sector reform research teams in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali during 
summer 2009. The survey instrument consisted of an individual 13-page questionnaire, divided into 
two  sections.  Although  a  similar  version  of  the  questionnaire  was  used  across  the  three West 
African countries under study, some personalized questions were added to account for the local 
realities of each country. Both qualitative and quantitative information were collected through the 
survey. The quantitative data is processed with statistical tools in order to compare determinants 
and  contexts  for  differing  technical  efficiency  across  the  three  countries.    The  qualitative 
information  collected  during  the  interview  process  serves  as  a  validation  tool  for  the  empirical 
results and is used to enrich the discussion.   
 
The first section of the survey encompassed all questions related to demographic (e.g., education 
and  experience),  household  (e.g.,  number  of  people  and  food  self-sufficiency),  and  farm 
characteristics (e.g., equipment, and crop production) of the respondent. The second section of the 
survey included all questions related to determinants of cotton supply. For instance, reasons that 
would  incite  (discourage)  farmers  to  grow  more  (less)  cotton,  types  of  intervention  that  would 
improve  the  cotton  sector  overall,  issues  related  with  the  input  provision,  technical  assistance 
received,  difficulty  with  the  joint  liability  program,  and  quality  of  the  relationship  with  union 
representatives,  among  others.  The  second  part  provided  information  regarding  the  level  of 
coordination  achieved  among  stakeholders  and,  therefore,  revealed  the  elements  of  the 
institutional arrangements that work well and the ones that need to be improved to ensure the 
viability of West African cotton sectors.  
 
In each country, 5 to 10 cotton producer organizations (GVPCs in Benin, GPCs in Burkina Faso, 
and SCPCs in Mali) were initially selected from different cotton regions. The main objective of this 
survey was to gather information at the farm level from a fairly diverse population in order to get 
deeper  insights  about  their  realities  as  cotton  farmers  (Serra,  2008).  Therefore,  producer 
organizations  (POs)  presenting  different  characteristics  were  picked  for  interviews  across  the 
different cotton regions. In each POs, 10 to 12 cotton growers were randomly selected using the 
member list. The farmer sample was not stratified per farm size- small, medium, or large- as it has 
been done in other studies (e.g., Carter, 1984), since the definition of farm size is not consistent 
across the three countries. For instance, the number of equipment (e.g., ploughs and carts) and 
plough  animals  (e.g.,  oxen)  are  at  the  base  of  the  definition  in  Mali,  whereas  the  number  of 
hectares is the criteria used in Benin.  
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In Benin, surveys were conducted in 4 GVPCs located in the North and in 1 GVPC from both the 
Central and South regions of the country. More GVPCs were selected in the North to account for 
the fact that cotton is mainly produced there. In total, 90 cotton producers, 15 in each GVPC, were 
interviewed across the three main cotton regions.  In Burkina Faso, 12 cotton growers per GPC 
were  interviewed  across  two  main  cotton  regions.  In  Houndé,  2  GPCs  were  chosen  whereas 
interviews were conducted in 3 GPC in the Bobo region. The sample of Burkinabe cotton producers 
totaled  60.  In  Mali,  surveys  were  conducted  in  12  SCPCs  located  across  5  cotton  regions  (3 
SCPCs  in  Koutiala,  2  SCPCs  in  Sikasso,  Fana,  Ouéléssébougou,  and  Kita,  and  1  SCPC  in 
Bougouni). The total number of farmer interviews totaled 114
18. 
 
Production economic theory is based on several assumptions concerning both the output and input 
sets (See Coelli, 2005 for a detailed description). Two assumptions are of particular interest for this 
study. First, zero production is impossible from a given sets of inputs. Second, zero level of inputs 
cannot produce positive level of output. Therefore, all interviewed farmers that did not produce 
cotton and/or did not use a positive quantity of each traditional input (labor, land, chemical inputs 
on credit, and equipment) during the crop campaign 2008/2009 are excluded from the dataset. 
Other  efficiency  studies  at  the  farm  level  also  had  to  deal  with  restrained  dataset  due  to  the 
deletion of non-producing farmers and incomplete records (e.g., Bravo-Ureta and Evenson, 1994). 
At the end, the sample used for estimating the technical efficiency at the farm level includes 81 




A Cobb-Douglas functional form for the stochastic frontier is chosen for the analysis of technical 
efficiency in the three cotton sectors. The Cobb-Douglas has been widely used in efficiency studies 
on  agricultural  sector  of  developed  and  developing  countries,  and  especially  on  cotton  (e.g., 
Gebremedhin et al. 2009; Chakraboborty et al., 2002; Shafiq and Rehman, 2000; Bravo-Ureta and 
Evenson 1994). Despite being less flexible than other functional forms, the Cobb-Douglas provides 
a nice economic interpretation (coefficients measure elasticity) and allows saving some degrees of 
freedom (which is important given the relatively small number of observations in each country). 
Results  from  previous  studies  suggest  that  technical  efficiency  measures  are  not  significantly 
affected by the choice of the functional form (Ahmad and Bravo-Ureta, 1996; Koop and Smith, 
1980).  
 
The Cobb Douglas stochastic frontier model used for the econometric analysis is written as; 
 
       =    +           
 
    +     −                                                                                                    (7) 
 
where  the  subscripts  i  and  c  represent  the  i-th  farmer  growing  cotton  in  the  c-th  country, 
respectively.  The  traditional  explanatory  variables  included  in  the  stochastic  frontier  production 
model  are  similar  to  those  used  in  previous  cotton  efficiency  studies  (Helfand  and  Levine, 
2004;Audibert et al., 2003; Chakraborty et al., 2002; Battese and Broca, 1997; Bravo-Ureta and 
Evenson,  1994).  These  variables  can  be  classified  into  four  general  categories:  labor,  inputs, 
equipment, and land.  Given that cotton production is mainly rain-fed in West Africa, there was not 
                                                           
18 In each CPC, 10 cotton growers were interviewed at the exception of one CPC in the Kita region, where only 6 
surveys were conducted due to an external event. A tornado hit the village few days earlier and, therefore, many 
farmers were too busy repairing the damage to answer the questionnaire (10*12 + 6= 114).   14 
 
need to make a distinction between irrigated and non-irrigated fields. Following is a description of 
the traditional variables used in the regression;  
 
Y represents the logarithmic quantity of cotton harvested (in kgs) 
   represents the logarithm of total amount of active family labor (in person)
19 
   is a dummy variable having a value of one if the farm hires non-family labor to work on the 
cotton fields; zero otherwise 
   represents the logarithm of total purchased inputs- seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides 
(in CFAs). This includes both direct and credit purchases. 
   represents the logarithm of total amount of equipment- owned ploughs, carts, sprayers, and 
tractors (in CFA) 
   represents the logarithm of the ratio of cotton acreage over total cultivated land (%)
20 
  
   represents  the  regional  dummy  variables  to  taken  into  account  soil  and  climatic  condition 
differences.  
    represents the stochastic component error  
    represents the technical inefficiency  
 
Table 1 provides a statistic summary of the production factors for each country sample. The mean 
is reported as a measure of central tendency. The standard deviation as well as the minimum and 
maximum  are  included  to  show  the  dispersion  of  the  observations  within  each  sample.  The 
average production per farm is higher in Benin (6250 kg) than in Burkina Faso (3055 kg) and in 
Mali (3571 kg). This can be explained by the fact that interviewed Beninese farmers cultivate more 
hectares  of  cotton,  purchased  more  cotton  inputs  such  as  pesticides,  and  have  higher  cotton 
yields. Moreover, the majority of the Beninese farms hired non-family labor whereas the work on 
Malian cotton fields is mainly done by family labor. No interviewed producers reported owing a 
tractor in Benin and Burkina Faso, compared with 2 farmers in Mali. Note that these tractors can be 
seen as a gift from the government to encourage cotton production, since their purchases have 
been highly subsidized. Owning a tractor does not necessarily reflect the purchasing power of the 
farmer. In our sample, the Burkinabe farmers are the most specialized in cotton production across 
the three countries. Indeed, half of their cultivated land is planted with cotton. The lower number of 
active family members working on cotton field in Burkina Faso can be explained by the smaller size 
of their farm compared to those in Benin and Mali.    
 
Following production theory, it is expected that a greater endowment of labor, inputs, equipment, 
and land devoted to cotton contribute positively to higher level of cotton production. However, it is 
still  unclear  how  the  institutional  context  affects  farmer’s  ability  to  be  technically  efficient.  This 
cross-country study contributes to the literature by empirically assessing how the use of traditional 
production factors is impacted by the environment in which farmers are working. Given that the 
APP  dataset  used  in  this  study  is  based  on  information  collected  through  similar  survey 
questionnaire and methodology across the three West African countries, comparative analysis is 
possible.  
                                                           
19 A better measure would have been the total number of man days of work spent on cotton fields, but this 
information was not collected by the surveys used in this study. Male and female workers are not weighted 
equally. Given that females also have to take care of the children, and domestic chores, they generally have less 
time to spend on the cotton fields. Therefore, they receive a lower weight (0.8).  
20 Note that cotton acreage and purchased cotton inputs are strongly correlated in Burkina Faso (corr=94%) and 
in  Mali  (corr=88%).    The  correlation  between  cotton  land  and  inputs  is  weaker,  but  still  strong,  in  Benin 
(corr=74%).    To  avoid  correlation  between  these  two  explanatory  variables,  land  has  been  included  in  the 
regression through the use of a ratio rather than acreage. A very weak correlation exists between cotton land 
ratio and value of inputs in all three countries.  15 
 
 
Environment is a broad term that encompasses four different categories as defined by Audibert et 
al. (2003). The first category includes structural factors such as food self-sufficiency and cereal 
acreage. The second category deals with human capital, including education and farm experience. 
Social  factors,  such  as  satisfaction  with  the  management  of  producer  organizations  and  local 
culture,  compose  the  third  category.  The  last  category  consists  of  institutional  factors,  such 
technical  assistance  and  extension  services.  Unlike  the  human  capital  category,  social  and 
institutional  factors  as  well  as  structural  (with  the  exception  of  farm  size),  have  received  less 
attention  in  studies  of  efficiency  in  agriculture.  Therefore,  structural,  social  and  institutional 
variables shaping the cotton sector in West Africa are included in the inefficiency score regression 
in order to examine their roles on performance.    
 
The  model  of  technical  inefficiency  effects  on  the  stochastic  frontier  equation  (7),  including 
environmental factors, is determined by 
 
    =    +         
 
    +                                                                                                                   (8) 
 
where,      represents the j-th environmental characteristics of the i-th farmer producing in the c-th 
country.  
 
   is a dummy variable having a value of one if the farm is food self-sufficient; zero otherwise   
   represents the number of hectares cultivated with cereals-sorghum, millet and maize (ha)   
   represents farmer experience in growing cotton (in years)   
   is a dummy variable having a value of one if the farmer is literate; zero otherwise 
   is a dummy variable having a value of one if the farmer consider the norms prevailing in the 
cooperative to be restrictive to the achievement of high performance; zero otherwise 
   is a dummy variable having a value of one if the farmer has experienced difficulty with the joint 
liability program; zero otherwise 
   is a dummy variable having a value of one if the farmer has received technical assistance and 
extension services over the last five years; zero otherwise 
   is a dummy variable having a value of one if the farmer is optimistic about the future of the 
cotton sector; zero otherwise. 
 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the institutional environment variables include in this 
analysis. In average, 2.82 hectares of land are allocated to cereals per cotton farm in Burkina Faso. 
This number is larger in Benin and Mali with 5.17 and 7.46 hectares, respectively. However, levels 
of self-sufficiency among Malian and Burkinabe farmers are comparable. The percentage of literate 
farmers is very similar in Burkina Faso and Mali, but higher in Benin. A majority of the Burkinabe 
farmers  are  dissatisfied  with  how  their  GPC  is  managed,  whereas  the  Malian  producers  seem 
overall satisfied. The joint liability program appears to be a more important issue in Benin than in 
Mali  and  Burkina  Faso,  with  87%  of  farmers  who  experienced  problems  with  it.  Also,  more 
Beninese  farmers  have  received  technical  assistance  over  the  past  years  and  they  are  more 
confident that the cotton situation will improve.     
 
The hypotheses regarding the influence of the non-traditional factors on cotton farmer technical 






To our knowledge, no study on technical efficiency has examined the role of food self-sufficiency 
on  cash  crop  outputs.  Looking  at  the  interrelation  between  food  self-sufficiency  and  cotton 
production in the 18
th century in the South of the United States when food markets were not well-
developed, Gallman (1970) found that plantations with high levels of maize output also have higher 
levels of cotton output. Given the presence of imperfect food markets (e.g., inadequate roads and 
transport systems) in our three countries, it is expected that farmers that are food self-sufficient are 
more efficient in producing cotton.  
 
The expected sign of the coefficient of cereal hectares is ambiguous. On one hand, cereal and 
cotton crops are directly competing for certain resources such as land allocation and chemical 
inputs. In the absence of an efficient cereal input distribution channel, there is a high incentive for 
Malian farmers to divert some of their cotton inputs toward their cereal fields. Therefore, cereal 
hectares may negatively impact cotton production. On the other hand, complementary dimensions 
of cotton and cereal crops may be more important than the competing ones. Given that both crops 
require use of labor and equipment at different periods, growing cereals should not reduce cotton 
capacity (Jayne, 1994; Gallman, 1970). In comparison with farms practicing cotton monoculture, 
farmers who practice crop rotations are more likely to get higher yields due to a better conservation 
of soil resources (Hulugalle and  Scott,  2008; Naudin and  Balarabe,  2005). Indeed, sustainable 
cereal-cotton rotations may maintain or may even improve soil structure and fertility by increasing 
soil organic matter content and decreasing soil erosion, and minimize disease and pest incidence. 
Therefore, cotton farmer inefficiency may decline with cereal acreage. 
 
Human Capital Factors 
 
Unlike previous studies that include farmer age, we prefer to use years of farming experience since 
its effect on efficiency can be more directly measured. Indeed, it  is expected that more cotton 
farming experience leads to higher cotton productivity (Thirtle et al., 2003). The influence of age on 
efficiency is not as straightforward. On one hand, older farmers may have more years of farming 
experience, and, therefore, efficiency may be higher. On the other hand, older farmers may be 
more reluctant to changes in cotton farming practices, and, therefore, productivity may be lower. 
 
Literate farmers are generally assumed to have better farming capacity and access to information, 
and, therefore, to be more efficient (Gebremedhin et al., 2009). However, the lack of statistically 
significant relationship between basic level of education and efficiency in previous works has been 
explained by the potential presence of a stage of development threshold below which the expected 





                                                           
21 No direct measure of farm size is included in the regression, since there is no consensus over a definition 
across the three countries. As previously mentioned, farm size is defined in terms of acreage in Benin, whereas 
owned equipment is the measure used to differentiate small, medium, and large farms in Mali.  Nevertheless, this 
structural  factor  is  indirectly  taken  into  account  through  the  use  of  inputs,  cotton  land  ratio,  and  equipment 





Governance  problems  and  internal  conflicts  inside  collective  action  organizations  may  restrain 
production to reach its full potential and may lead to the withdrawal of some producers, as was the 
case  for  rice  farmers  in  Benin  (Kinkinggninhoun-Medagbe  et  al.,  2010;  p59).  In  our  case,  it  is 
assumed that farmers, who subjectively believe that the norms prevailing in their cotton producer 
organizations are restrictive, are technically more efficient. Indeed, producers who are dissatisfied 
with  management  of  their  cooperatives  are  more  likely  to  be  entrepreneurial  and,  thus,  to 
understand  the  discrepancy  between  status-quo  and  what  would  be  possible  under  efficient 




Although group lending programs are very common among cotton farmer organizations in Africa, 
their influences on productivity is still debatable. The principle of joint liability in loan programs is 
not problematic, per se, but its application may lead to undesirable outcomes. If every producer 
decided  to  participate  actively,  they  would  all  be  better-off  under  this  cooperative  arrangement 
(Lawrence, 2003). However, cooperation requires a high level of commitment from everyone. Lack 
of  commitment  may  lead  to  opportunistic  behaviors  that  are  detrimental  for  the  group  lending 
initiative. Local realities, such as conflicts between age, ethnicity, and class groups, have been 
found to affect cooperative efficiency (Woods, 1999). The expected sign for the joint liability dummy 
is ambiguous.  
 
A positive relationship between technical inefficiency and farmers that reported having issues with 
the joint liability would suggest that these latter are struggling to produce enough to cover their 
loans. Indeed, less performing farmers may have to sell assets or ask for outside help in order to 
be able to repay their loans. In contrast, a negative sign would suggest that the most performing 
farmers are the ones experiencing problems with the joint liability program, since a part of their 
profits go to cover the financial losses of other members.  
 
In the developing world, technical support and extension services offered to producers have been 
widely recognized as a key factor contributing positively  to  production by providing  advice  and 
information on how to improve technical skills in farming operations (e.g Keil et al., 2007; Haji, 
2006). However, expectations regarding the performance of agricultural extension services remain 
low  since  their  delivery  faces  many  limitations  (Poulton  et  al.,  2010).  For  instance,  technical 
assistance  received  by  farmers  may  be  of  poor  quality  or  the  method  use  to  transmit  the 
information may be inadequate.  
 
A  very  limited  number  of  studies  have  examined  how  farmer  attitude  toward  market  reforms 
influences  their  productivity.  Among  those,  Mude  (2006)  found  that  pessimistic  farmers,  those 
lacking  of  confidence  in  policymakers  to  improve  their  situation,  are  more  likely  to  be  less 
technically efficient.      
 
5 Empirical Results 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of average production function as well as the maximum 
likelihood parameters (MLE) of the stochastic production frontier for different distributional forms 18 
 
are first estimated using the software Stata version 11.1. A one-sided likelihood ratio
22 is used to 
test whether technical inefficiency is present in the dataset. If technical inefficiency is detected, the 
stochastic production frontier is more appropriate. Otherwise, the OLS estimator is better-suited for 
the  data.  Then,  the  stochastic  production  frontier  model  providing  the  best  goodness  of  fit  is 
analyzed  using  the  computer  program,  Frontier  4.1  (see  Coelli,  2005  for  a  description  of  the 
program).  The  advantage  of  the  software  Frontier  4.1  is  that  it  allows  analyzing  the  impact  of 




As  seen  in  Table  4,  the  average  production  (OLS)  function  better  fits  the  Beninese  dataset.  
Indeed, the likelihood ratio test for the presence of inefficiency fails to be rejected. Therefore, the 
stochastic production frontier model reduces to a simple OLS model with a normal disturbance 
term, i.e. that the Beninese cotton producers in the sample appear to be fully technically efficient. A 
first hypothesis would be that unfavorable conditions during the 2008/2009 crop campaign (large 
noise  effects)  reduced  the  gap  between  the  observed  and  frontier  outputs  to  non-statistically 
significant levels (See Figure 2). A second hypothesis would be that the market-oriented reforms in 
the cotton sector led to the withdrawal of underperforming farmers and, therefore, cotton is, now, 
mainly produced by the most efficient ones. From 1999 to 2003, approximately forty percent of 
Beninese households, who were once producing cotton, stopped production due principally to debt 
issues related to policy implemented over the years (Siaens and Wodon, 2003). A third possible 
hypothesis is that the actual production frontier is so low that farmers can easily produce on its 
frontier. If this is the case, new technologies, such as BT cotton, should be introduced to move the 
production  frontier  outward  (See  Figure  2).  Otherwise,  failure  to  push  the  production  frontier 
outward  could  jeopardize  the  ability  of  Beninese  cotton  farmers  to  be  competitive  on  the 
international market (Kelly and al., 2011).  
 
As expected, all input factors-labor, inputs, equipment, and land- have a significant positive effect 
on cotton production. The estimated elasticity coefficients for value of inputs (seeds, pesticides, 
insecticides, and fertilizers) purchased
23 and for value of equipment are significant at the 99% and 
95% confidence intervals, respectively. Farms that are better equipped and that have better access 
to inputs on credit are more likely to get higher level of cotton production. A negative relationship 
exists  between  cotton  output  and  farms  located  in  the  southern  region  of  Benin.  This  result  is 
pertinent since the agro-climatic conditions in the South are less appropriate to cotton crops than 
those in the Northern part of the country. The central region appears to be the best location to grow 
cotton in Benin. One possible explanation is that farms located in the central region benefit from 
both appropriate agro-climatic conditions and good access to services due to their proximity to the 
port and the largest city, Cotonou.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that, in our sample, Beninese farmers are technically efficient, which 
does not necessary imply that they are also allocatively efficient. Indeed, they are producing the 
optimal level of outputs given the productive factors they use and the technology available, but they 
might not allocate them the most efficiently. Increased production would lead to a decline in farmer 
income if this increase was associated with additional costs that exceed the additional revenues 
from  the  marginal  gain  in  outputs.  Therefore,  being  technically  efficient  does  not  imply  that 
                                                           
22 Likelihood ratio (LR)=2(Log-likelihood of the unrestricted model- log-likelihood of the restricted model)∼ χ 
  (2α) 
Ho: ϒ=0, where   ϒ=  
 /  . This implies that   
  = 0, and therefore, there is no technical inefficiency. 
23 Over 95% of the inputs are obtained through credit. 19 
 
Beninese  farmers  are  less  poor.  Unfortunately,  it  is  not  possible  to  measure  the  allocative 
efficiency, since costs of productive factors were not all collected.  
 
5.3 Burkina Faso 
 
The estimated elasticity coefficients for non-family labor and cotton land ratio are not statistically 
different from zero in the Burkina Faso dataset (see Table 5). Given that these two input factors are 
statistically insignificant; they have been disregarded in the model specification
24. The magnitude 
and  level  of  significance  of  the  other  input  variable  coefficient  estimates  remain  relatively 
unchanged across the different OLS models.  The high adjusted R
2 value (0.83) suggests that the 
predictive ability of the model is high.  
 
Results from OLS and MLE are reported in Table 6. With the exception of the regional dummy, all 
coefficient  parameters  estimated  by  maximum  likelihood  are  smaller  in  magnitude  than  those 
obtained through OLS. The likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of absence of technical 
inefficiency. Therefore, the stochastic production frontier  is better suited for the analysis of the 
Burkinabe sample. Among the different distributional forms, the half-normal specification is the one 
chosen to estimate the stochastic production function and the technical efficiency scores
25.  As 
expected,  a  greater  endowment  of  family  labor,  purchased  inputs  and  equipment  contribute 
positively to higher level of production. The purchased input elasticity coefficient is the largest and 
is significant at the 99% confidence level. The regional dummy is also statistically significant from 
zero. Farms located in the Bobo region are more likely to have lower level of cotton production than 
those in Hounde.   
 
In Burkina Faso, over 99% of the cotton inputs are obtained through credit allocated by the ginning 
companies  at  the  beginning  of  the  crop  season.  An  important  aspect  of  the  Burkinabe  cotton 
market is that farmers have access to inputs on credit for both cotton and cereals through their 
national union, UNPCB. Interestingly, the quantity of cotton inputs purchased by farmers is highly 
correlated with the number of cotton acreage (corr= 94%). In comparison, 85% of the cereal inputs 
are obtained through credit and the correlation with acreage is relatively low (corr=52%).  
 
When  asked  what  the  main  constraint  to  diversify  from  cotton  was,  Burkinabe  farmers  almost 
unanimously answered the lack of market access for other crops (51 farmers out of 56). Given that 
inadequate  access to credit and insufficient access to inputs  were among the possible answer 
choices, this suggests that the highest correlation  between cotton acreage and inputs is not  a 
manifestation of issues within the input market for cereals. It might imply that farmers are getting a 
quantity of inputs that is close to the optimal recommendation per hectare made by the ginning 
companies. No information on the level of indebtedness of farmers and on their previous credit 
reimbursement  rates  was  collected.  Otherwise,  it  would  have  been  interesting  to  investigate 
whether inputs on credit are mainly allocated as a function of the cotton acreage planted or as a 
function of the farmer past solvency rates. Given that previous debts incurred by Burkinabe cotton 
producers were forgiven, they might have an incentive to get the maximum amount of inputs per 
hectare possible, no matter their capability to repay.  
                                                           
24 An F-test is used to compare whether model 1 (including hired labor dummy and cotton land ratio) gives a 
significantly better fit to the data than model 2 (excluding hired labor dummy and cotton land ratio). The null 
hypothesis that model 1 does not provide a better fit than model 2 fails to be rejected:  F(2,49)= 3.187> 1.029.         
F-test= (RSS2- RSS1)/ (P1-P2) 
                  RSS1/ (N-P1) 
25 As seen in Table 5, results obtained from the half-normal and exponential distributional forms are very similar.  20 
 
Table 10 reports the frequency distribution of TE estimates for the Burkina Faso sample. The mean 
technical  efficiency  (TE)  is  estimated  to  be  69%  among  the  interviewed  Burkinabe  cotton 
producers. Although the TE showed great variability (TE ranging from 26% to 96%), only 16% of 
producers  are  below  0.50.    Variations  in  the  technical  efficiency  of  cotton  farmers  have  been 
analyzed through the use of environmental factors.    
 
The coefficient estimates of the inefficiency model in the Burkinabe cotton sector are reported in 
Table 7. It is important to keep in mind that a negative sign of a coefficient stands for a negative 
impact on inefficiency- an efficiency enhancing factor-, whereas a positive coefficient sign implies 
an efficiency reducing effect. Among all environmental variables, the human social capital factors- 
years  of  cotton  farming  experience  and  literacy-  and  the  number  of  cereal  hectares  have  the 
largest standard errors relative to their coefficient estimates
26. Given the small size of the sample, 
these three variables have been excluded from the final model specification, based on the results 
from a generalized likelihood ratio test, in order to save some degrees of freedom.  
 
The  institutional  factors-  whether  farmers  have  received  technical  assistance  and  extension 
services over the past five years and whether they have struggled with the joint liability program- 
are  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  The  social  factor-  cooperative  norms-  is  negative  and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Producers, who believe that social norms are restraining 
their GPC to be better managed, are technically more efficient. How producer organizations, GPCs 
in Burkina Faso, deal with farmer payment, indebtedness, and their internal funds, are considered 
by these farmers to be efficiency reducing. Norms prevailing inside the cooperative structure do not 
effectively encourage timely payment to farmers, good management of indebted farmer cases, and 
a productive and transparent use of the internal GPC funds. This situation is not unique to cotton 
growers. Govereh et al. (1999) report that coffee farmers in Kenya started to side-sell in order to 
avoid  working  with  poorly  functioning  coffee  cooperative  societies.  Mude  (2006)’s  results  also 
suggest  that  the  most  performing  Kenyan  coffee  producers  are  dissatisfied  with  the  poor 
management  of  their  cooperatives.  Similarly,  Audibert  et  al.  (2003)  find  a  negative  relationship 
between social cohesiveness and efficiency for Ivorian cotton producers. Their results show that 
cotton  farms  located  in  villages  where  social  cohesiveness  is  lower,  are  more  efficient.  A  new 
question arising from this finding is whether farmers that consider social norms prevailing in the 




As seen in Table 8, all elasticity coefficients are statistically significant, with the exception of family 
labor. Using the likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis stipulating the absence of inefficiency is 
rejected.  Therefore,  it  is  more  appropriate  to  analyze  the  Malian  dataset  with  a  stochastic 
production frontier than an OLS model. The largest estimated elasticity parameter is cotton land 
ratio. Farms with a higher proportion of their cultivated land planted with cotton are more likely to 
produce more. Interestingly, the Malian farmers are the less specialized in cotton across the three 
countries, by growing cotton on less than 1/3 of their cultivable land. This percentage is consistent 
with Fok (2008)’s result that cotton share in the Malian cropping system does not exceed 30% of 
the cultivated land. The elasticity coefficient for equipment is also relatively large in Mali.   
 
                                                           
26 Other studies, such as Mude (2006), found that socio-demographic variables were not statistically related with 
degree of efficiency.  21 
 
A statistically significant difference was found across farms located within the Old Cotton Basin. 
Cotton production in the Northeastern and Central regions is lower than in the Southern region. As 
expected, level of cotton output from the New Cotton Basin (Western region) is significantly lower 
than in the Southeast region.     
 
The frequency distribution of TE estimates for the Malian sample is reported in Table 10. The mean 
technical efficiency (TE) among the Malian cotton producers is 46% and over 60% of the farmers 
are below a TE score of 0.50. The TE ranges from 15% to 95%. Differences in farmer technical 
inefficiency are examined through the use of environmental factors. 
 
Table 9 reports the coefficient estimates for the one-stage technical inefficiency model. Given that 
cooperative norm and technical assistance variables were highly insignificant- their standard errors 
largely exceeded the estimated parameter values- they have been dropped from the final model. 
Farmers that are food self-sufficient are more technically efficient in producing cotton as expected. 
First, farmers that produce enough food to meet their family needs are more likely to spend more 
time on their fields and less on off-farm activities. Indeed, the availability of off-farm income is found 
to be efficiency reducing (Keil et al., 2007). Secondly, they might also have better farm managerial 
and technical skills, which are also beneficial to cotton crop. 
 
Interestingly, the cereal hectare coefficient estimates is negative and highly significant. Cultivating 
more hectares of cereals- maize, millet, and sorghum- reduces cotton grower technical inefficiency. 
The Malian cotton sector is characterized by the absence of an efficient distribution channel for 
cereal  inputs. Given that  cotton farmers have been used to farm in an  integrating system that 
involves  livestock  production  and  cereal-cotton  crop  rotation,  they  have  coped  with  the  limited 
access to cereal inputs on credit by deviating some of their cotton inputs, such as fertilizers and 
pesticides, on their cereal fields. Although, input deviation might reduce cotton production if a sub-
optimal dosage is applied, it might bring some benefits too. First, soil fertility is generally better 
preserved on farms practicing rotation between cotton and cereals compared to those practicing 
only cotton monoculture (Hulugalle and Scott, 2008). Second, farmers with greater cereal area 
might be in a better position to feed their animals during the dry season, which also coincides with 
the plowing season. Indeed, the use of cereal straw improves the feed situation of animal in the dry 
season (Bakker et al., 1997).   
 
Literacy  and  farming  experience  are  both  statistically  insignificant.  Previous  study  shows  that 
illiteracy does not restrain Malian farmers to cope with scouting cotton pest and to properly use the 
right chemical (Michel, 2000; cited by Fok, 2008; p.200). The coefficient for the joint liability variable 
is positive but not statistically different from zero. The estimated parameter for whether farmers are 
confident that the cotton situation will improve in the future is positive and statistically significant. 
This suggests that optimistic farmers are more technically inefficient. This finding contrasts with 
Mude (2006)’s result that Kenyan coffee producers lacking of confidence in the future are less 
efficient. Qualitative information gathered during interviews reveals that optimistic farmers believe 
that inputs will become cheaper and that better support to purchase equipment will be provided 
with the reform process. The higher level of inefficiency among optimistic farmers may suggest that 
they have access to fewer resources and, thus, hope that their farming situation will improve with 








Overall,  the  production  factors  are  all  positive  and  mainly  statistically  significant  in  the  three 
countries. The family labor elasticity coefficient is 0.252 in Benin and 0.172 in Burkina Faso. In the 
stochastic  production  frontier  model  including  inefficiencies,  the  family  labor  is  statistically 
insignificant in the Malian sample. Hiring labor positively influences the level of cotton production in 
Benin (βhired=0.399) and Mali (βhired=0.226). The value of owned equipment is highly significant in all 
countries, but the magnitude of the coefficient is larger in Mali. This is explained by the fact that 
Malian producers are better-equipped than their West African fellows
27. This finding is consistent 
with  Fok  (2008;  p.199),  who  mentioned  that  “Mali  distinguishes  itself  by  the  popularization  of 
animal-drawn so that only a small share of the peasants is strictly conducting manual farming”.  
 
In Benin and Burkina Faso, where farmers can more easily access inputs on credit for both cereal 
and  cotton  crops,  the  largest  elasticity  coefficient  is  value  of  inputs  (fertilizers,  pesticides, 
insecticides, and seeds). Unlike these two countries, cotton land over total cultivated land has the 
largest elasticity coefficient in the Malian dataset. Interestingly, access to inputs on credit is mainly 
available for cotton growers and the quantity on inputs available is proportional to the number of 
cotton hectares. Therefore, a strong incentive to plant cotton exists for Malian farmers.   
 
Among our three countries, inefficiency fails to be found in the Beninese dataset. Producers obtain 
the maximal (frontier) level of cotton outputs from a given set of inputs. However, before concluding 
that all Beninese farmers are fully technically efficient, it would be preferable to collect more data 
and  over  more  than  one  year,  to  ensure  that  efficient  level  of  outputs  are  not  the  result  of  a 
aggregate negative shock, such as bad luck or unfavorable climatic conditions. Data collected from 
developing  countries  are  also  more  susceptible  to  be  contaminated  by  statistical  noise  due  to 
measurement errors and variability in climatic conditions, resulting in underestimated TE scores 
(Coelli et al., 1998; p.219). In our case, random disturbances or random events might have lead to 
overestimate  the  TE  of  Beninese  farmers.  However,  if  Beninese  farmers  are  truly  technically 
efficient, there is an important need to find productive technologies that would shift outward the 
production frontier in order to improve their ability to compete on the international market.   
 
Technical inefficiency is present in both the Burkinabe and Malian datasets. An examination of the 
sources of inefficiency reveals that human capital factors have a positive sign but they are not 
statistically significant. Findings from previous studies on the influence of human capital on farmer 
technical efficiency in developing countries are mixed. Some studies find literacy to be efficiency 
reducing (Audibert et al., 2003), others to be efficiency enhancing (Gebremedhin et al. 2009; Keil et 
al., 2007), and others do not find any statistically significant relationship (Gul et al. (2009); Haji, 
2006; Battese and Coelli, 1995). As in previous studies such as Idiong (2007), a lack of association 
between farming experience and efficiency is obtained. This is in contrast with Gul et al. (2009)’s 
finding  that  farmer  experience  on  cotton  farming  positively  influences  efficiency.  Technical 
assistance  and  extension  services  offered  to  cotton  farmers  do  not  statistically  impact  their 
productivity
28.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  other  research  focusing  on  African  cotton  sectors 
(Ngassam et al., 2010). The coefficient for the joint liability variable is positive in both countries. 
However, we cannot conclude that farmers having issue with the joint liability program prevailing 
                                                           
27 Dropping the two observations with a tractor does not change the finding. Indeed, the minimum and maximum 
values remain unchanged and the mean value goes from just above one million CFA (1 111 370  CFA) to just 
below one million CFA (995 770 CFA) .  
28 A dummy variable accounting for technical assistance and extension services received over the previous year 
was created but it remained statistically insignificant.   23 
 
inside the cotton cooperatives are less efficient in producing cotton, since the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at the 10% level.        
 
The estimated coefficients that are statistically significant in the Malian inefficiency model appear 
insignificant in the Burkinabe model and vice-versa. For instance, being food self-sufficient and 
having a  larger number of cereal  hectares  do  not significantly influence farmer performance in 
Burkina, whereas they are highly efficiency enhancing factors in Mali. These findings suggest that 
cereal and cotton crops can be complementary to  each others. Even though cereal crops and 
cotton may compete in terms of land allocation, their relationship with other production factors such 
as labor, working capital, and crop management has complementary dimensions (Govereh et al., 
1999; p.3)  
 
Social norms prevailing in Burkinabe cotton producer organizations, GPCs, are reducing farmer 
efficiency.  These  social  norms  are  considered  inadequate  to  manage  farmer  payment, 
indebtedness,  and  cooperative  funds.  The  accrued  internal  debts  from  2006-2009  have  raised 
questions relative to the level of social cohesiveness that exists inside GPCs (Kaminski et al. 2009; 
p.16). 
 
With the Malian cotton sector facing many challenges, such as widespread indebtedness, farmers 
were asked whether the situation will improve. Interestingly, producers expressing confidence in 
the future of the Malian cotton sector are more likely to be less efficient. One possible explanation 
is that these farmers are optimistic that the reforms will provide them with better support to access 
equipment and inputs on credit.   
 
In our case study, the Burkinabe farmers are closer to their production efficiency frontier with an 
average  TE  score  of  0.69,  while  Malian  producers  are  further  away  from  their  own  production 
possibility frontier with an average TE score of 0.46. Although the range of the TE scores is similar 
across both countries, more farmers are above the 0.50 threshold in Burkina Faso than in Mali. In 
comparison with other technical efficiency studies on cotton sector in developing countries, the 
Burkinabe and Malian TE scores appear to be slightly higher and lower, respectively (See Table 
11).  
 
The possibility of pooling the Malian and Burkinabe datasets is examined, since it will increase the 
number of degrees of freedom and will provide a greater space for comparisons. However, before 
pooling  these  two  cross-sectional  datasets  together,  it  important  to  test  for  homogeneity  to 
determine whether pooling is appropriate to avoid biased estimates (Brobst and Gates, 1977). An 
F-test (a.k.a Chow test) based on the comparison of the residual sum of squares from the OLS 
individual country regressions with the residual sum of squares of the pooled OLS regression is 
estimated (Gould, 2005)
29. Given that the null hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected at the 99% 
confidence interval, pooling of these two datasets is inappropriate. The coefficients in the two OLS 
country regressions are statistically different, and, therefore they should not be pooled into one 




                                                           
29 F(K, N1+N2-2K) ∼ [     −     1 +    2  ] / K                    Fcritical(10, 118) ∼2.95 < Fcomputed=6.06 





This paper has discussed the main institutional changes that have taken place in the West African 
cotton sectors following the introduction and implementation of market reforms aimed to improve 
their performance. Traditionally, West African cotton sectors were characterized by the presence of 
a state-owned enterprise that was in charge of providing inputs, transporting, ginning, marketing, 
and exporting seed cotton. Interestingly, each country has undertaken the market-oriented reforms 
at a different pace and following a distinct path. Among our three countries, Benin has been the 
first one to reform, following by Burkina Faso and further behind by Mali Issues with the joint liability 
program prevailing inside cotton producer organizations are common to all three countries. Market 
structures, levels of farmer empowerment in the ownership of the privatized state-run companies 
and distribution channels for cereal and cotton inputs are the main distinguishing elements across 
these three West African cotton sectors.  
 
A stochastic frontier production has been used to estimate and compare the technical efficiency 
score  of  producers  in  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  and  Mali.  Specifically,  a  one-stage  estimation 
procedure is used to examine the effects of institutional environment on the technical efficiency 
scores at the farm-level in all three countries. Data used in this analysis are derived from surveys of 
cotton producers, conducted by the Cotton Sector Reform Project teams of the Africa, Power and 
Politics Programme in summer 2009. All production factors- labor, equipment, land, and inputs- 
have a positive sign and statistically impact the level of cotton output in the three countries. Higher 
production level could be achieved through a better access to inputs on credit and equipment, such 
as traction animals.    
 
The empirical results from the stochastic frontier analysis suggest that Beninese farmers are fully 
technically efficient, whereas the presence of technical inefficiency is found in the Burkinabe and 
Malian datasets. Agricultural development policies focusing on reducing the inefficiency at the farm 
level in Mali and Burkina Faso should be adopted, whereas policies designed to shift outward the 
production frontier are more appropriate for the case of Benin. The estimated average technical 
efficiency (TE) scores in Burkina Faso (0.69) and Mali (0.46) are consistent with those reported in 
previous efficiency studies on cotton production in developing countries. The TE scores suggest 
that Burkinabe cotton farmers are closer to their own best production frontier given the particular 
country’s conditions, while Malian farmers are further away from their production efficiency frontier.  
Technical  assistance  and  human  capital  factors-  literacy  and  farming  experience-,  do  not 
statistically explain differences in inefficiency among producers in both countries. The absence of 
significant relationship between these variables and efficiency has also been found in previous 
research. Even though all countries face some issues with the joint liability program prevailing in 
producer  organizations,  the  dummy  variable  used  to  capture  this  institutional  constraint  is  not 
statistically significant. Therefore, there is a need to develop a variable that will better capture the 
influence of group lending program on cotton farmer efficiency. 
 
In addition to the path and pace of the market reforms, the Burkina Faso and Mali cotton sectors 
can be differentiated in terms of their farmer inefficiency sources. In Burkina Faso, farmers that 
criticize the poor functioning of their producer organization are more efficient than those who think 
that they perform well. This new finding raises questions on whether these farmers are more driven 
by individualistic goals rather than group welfare, and whether the norms governing the functioning 
of producer organizations are more beneficial to the less performing farmers.  
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In  Mali,  farmers  that  are  food-secure  and  with  more  hectares  of  cereals  are  more  efficient  in 
producing cotton. These results support the argument that cotton and cereal crops have some 
complementary  dimensions.  Although  cereal  and  cotton  crops  are  directly  competing  for  the 
allocation  of  land  and  inputs,  they  both  benefit  from  improvement  in  labor,  working  capital, 
managerial and technical skills, and soil fertility from practicing crop rotation.  Another interesting 
finding is that Malian cotton farmers who believe that the sector would improve with the market 
reforms  are  more  likely  to  be  technically  less  efficient.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  these 
farmers have lower endowment, and, therefore, have more to gain than to lose with the reforms.  
   
Overall, the findings show the importance of considering environmental factors in stochastic frontier 
production and technical efficiency analysis. Although Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali cotton sectors 
have  some  characteristics  in  common,  their  level  of  farmer  technical  efficiency  differs.  More 
importantly, the sources of inefficiency are different from one country to another. For the reforms to 
be successful in improving the performance of the West African cotton sector, they would have to 
work in concert with the local realities.  
   
In Mali, a special attention should be given to the fact that cotton growers have been used to farm 
in  integrating  systems,  where  livestock  production,  cotton  and  cereal  crops  are  strongly 
interconnected. Improving access to cereal inputs on credit for cotton farmers would be a first step 
to revitalize the cotton sector. One way to increase cereal inputs availability would be to provide 
initial support to the GSCVM in the handling of logistic and financial operations. This would require 
a certain level of engagement from the government and financial institutions, such as the BNDA. 
For instance, if GSCVM future payment were secured by the government and the BNDA, input 
suppliers would be more likely to deliver the quantity needed and to do it on time. Another option 
that requires a deeper investigation would be to transfer cereal input functions to the producer 
union, UNSCPC. So far, cotton farmers in Burkina Faso have benefited from a good access to both 
cereal and cotton inputs on credit through their producer union, UNPCB. This is an avenue that 
might be interesting for Malian cotton farmers too.  
   
Improving  social  cohesiveness  inside  Burkinabe  producer  organizations,  GPCs,  would  require 
structural and behavioral changes. One option that deserves more analysis would be the creation 
of several sub-lending groups (known as “cercle de caution”) inside each GPC to facilitate peer-
monitoring. Those sub-groups would be in charge of monitoring each other’s behavior to ensure 
that the right quantity of inputs is purchased on credit and that they are used adequately and at the 
appropriate time. An ad-hoc committee should also be established to verify the work done by the 
GPCs’ representatives in order to promote transparency and good governance. In some cases, this 
might  even  lead  to  prompter  and  higher  farmer  payment.  This  would  require  the  provision  of 
training  sessions  to  farmers  to  teach  them  how  to  prevent,  detect,  and  deal  with  opportunistic 
behaviours at both farmer and GPC levels.  
 
A  better  understanding  of  local  realities  relevant  to  cotton  farmers  and  the  implementation  of 
reforms that are consistent with them are important steps to revitalize West African cotton sectors 
while having the potential to induce economic growth and poverty alleviation.  
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Figure 1
Figure 2, The Beninese Stochastic Production Frontier Case
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Table 1, Changes in the Institutional Environments of West African Cotton Sectors 
 
 
Market Structure  Ownership  Input Supply  POs 
  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 








SOCOBE, ICB, CCB, 
IBECO, LCB, SEIBC, 
MCI, SODICOT 








































SOFITEX  UNPCB 
1-Cotton and 
cereals 


























AVs  SCPCs 
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Table 2, Production Factor Summary Statistics 
Variables  Benin (N=81)  Burkina Faso (N=56)  Mali (N=82) 
  Mean 
(S.D) 
Min-Max  Mean 
(S.D) 







6250   
(8849) 
135-50000  3055    
(2458) 






4.43    
(4.87) 
0.5-27  950     
(311)        
360-1657  961 
(400)        
110-1878 





2-49  5.35    
(2.72) 






0.84    
(0.37) 
0-1  0.57    
(0.49) 






219274      
(263126) 
1000-     
925000 











394629    
(523055)      
15500-    
2800000 
235619    
(149070) 
55740-     
844210 







33.74    
(20.68) 
3.44-88.88  50.70   
(14.81) 







14.16    
(12.65) 
1.9-85  6.13    
(3.14)          
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Table 3, Institutional Environment Factor Summary Statistics 
Variables  Benin (N=81) 
 
Burkina Faso (N=56) 
 
Mali (N=82) 
  Mean 
(S.D) 
Min-Max  Mean 
(S.D) 








0-25  2.82 
(1.58) 








1-45  10.89 
(5.62) 
2-31  23.03 
(12.50) 
2-50 

























































































0 = no, 1=yes    34 
 
Table 4, OLS and MLE Production Function Estimates, Benin (N=81) 
Variables  OLS  Half-Normal  Exponential  Truncated-
Normal 




Does not fit 
 the data 
-1.340 
(0.901) 




  0.252** 
(0.100) 




  0.399** 
(0.173) 




  0.087** 
(0.034) 




  0.570*** 
(0.077) 




































































(Prob ≤ z) 
  -61.522 
 
1.000 




Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** = statistically significant at the 90, 95 and 99-percent confidence 
levels, respectively. North is the omitted cotton region. 
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Table 5, OLS Production Function Estimates, Burkina Faso (N=56) 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2 






















Cotton Land Ratio  0.150 
(0.147) 
---------- 















Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** = statistically significant at the 
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Table 6, OLS and MLE Production Function Estimates, Burkina Faso (N=56) 
Variables  OLS  Half-Normal  Exponential  Truncated 






Do not converge 




































































   
Loglikelihood 
Likelihood ratio 
test sigma u=0 
(Prob> Chibar2) 





Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** = statistically significant at the 90, 95 and 99-percent confidence levels, 




Table 7, Production Function and Technical Inefficiency Estimates, Burkina Faso 
(N=56) 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 





























































Cereal               
Acreage 
 
-----------  -----------  -----------  -0.029 
(0.076) 





-----------  -----------   
-0.006 
(0.020) 












































































LR Test- one sided 
error 

















Mean Eff.  0.699  0.694  0.695  0.677 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** = statistically significant at the 90, 95 and 99-percent confidence levels, 
respectively. Hounde is the omitted cotton region. 38 
 
Table 8, OLS and MLE Production Function Estimates, Mali (N=82) 
Variables  OLS  Half-Normal  Exponential  Truncated-
Normal 




















































       



















































































Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** = statistically significant at the 90, 95 and 99-percent 
confidence levels, respectively. Southern is the omitted cotton region. 
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Table 9, Production Function and Technical Inefficiency Estimates, Mali (N=82) 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
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LR Test- one 
sided error 





















Mean Eff.  0.442  0.443  0.463  0.617  0.597 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** = statistically significant at the 90, 95 and 99-percent confidence levels, 
respectively. Southern is the omitted cotton region. 
 
 
Table 10, Technical Efficiency Scores of Burkinabe and Malian Cotton Farmers 
  Eff. ≤ 0.25  0.25< Eff. ≤ 0.50  0.50< Eff. ≤ 0.75  Eff. >0.75 
Burkina Faso (n=56)  0  9  24  23 
Mali (n=82)  14  37  20  11 
 
 
Table 11, Review of Cotton Technical Efficiency Studies 
Authors (year)  Country  # Obs.  TE Scores  TE Range 
Ngassam et al. (2010)  Cameroon  202  0.602  0.11-0.91 
 
Gul et al. (2009) 
 
 


















































Bravo-Ureta  and  Evenson 
(1994) 
Paraguay  87  0.582  0.19-0.85 
1= low malaria density infection, 2= high density malaria infection 